Chapter 2

Conceptualising political territoriality

We need to know not only what territoriality is, but what it does.

Robert Sack[1]

Time and space cannot be treated as some uniform background noise, as abstract ontological conditions to be acknowledged and then ignored.

Rob Walker[2]

2.1 A political strategy, not an instinct

The etymological origin of 'territory' is often traced back to the Latin 'terra' (geographic area) and 'terrere' (to frighten: to terrorise).[3] Presumably based on the allegedly violent evolution of territorial states, it has subsequently been suggested that polities organise themselves territorially only for the sake of security and protection. However, Jean Gottmann suggests instead that the concept of territory originates from 'terra' and 'torium' (belonging to, surrounding).[4] Territory would thus have a certain notion of centrality, an area around a centre such as a city or an abbey. Whatever its origin may be, territory is used here to denote a demarcated geographic area governed and

---

[1] Sack, R. (1986), *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 18.
[2] Walker, R.B.J. (1993), *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 130-131.
[3] Paasi, A. (2003), 'Territory', in J. Agnew, J., K. Mitchell, G. Toal (eds.) (2003), *A Companion to Political Geography*. Malden (MA): Blackwell). p. 110.
[4] Gottmann, J. (1973), *The Significance of Territory*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. pp. 5, 16, 26.

controlled by a political institution.[5] It is only through the assertion of control through demarcation that a geographical area is turned into territory. A geographically concentrated phenomenon, such as a language area, or geographical indication, such as Europe, is not a territory, unless it is demarcated for political purposes. In other words, a territory does not exist without human activity regulating access to a purposefully delimited geographical area. Thus, the adjective 'geographical' includes a wider range of phenomena than 'territorial', while the adjective 'spatial' refers both to geographical and non-geographical spaces.[6] These distinctions also allow distinguishing membership space from territorial space.[7] Territorial space refers only to a demarcated geographical area, while membership space can also be based on religion, kinship, occupation, or nationality, which may be geographically concentrated, but not necessarily be based on territory.

The assertion of territorial control has been explained as an innate, instinctive inclination of human beings to possess and to defend an area against intruders, similar to animals.[8] Although every individual human being requires some space to live, and feels emotionally attached to certain places, the diversity of political entities in the past and present shows that neither individuals nor social collectives seek instinctively fixed, closed, and clearly demarcated territories for their survival or the protection of property.[9] People may feel more comfortable and relaxed when they control 'their' territory, yet the scale and size of the territory they consider as their 'natural' home, or as their fatherland - their backyard, city, region, village, state, federation, neighbourhood, empire, etc. - is indeterminate. Moreover, people may feel 'home' in several overlapping, nested or intersecting territories, as the slogan of the French communists in the 1950s illustrates:

---

[5] Idem, p. 16.
[6] *Cf.* Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1, p. 23.
[7] Rokkan, S. & Urwin, D. (1982), 'Introduction: Centres and Peripheries in Western Europe', in S. Rokkan, D. Urwin (eds.), *The Politics of Regional Identity: Studies in European Regionalism*. London: Sage. p. 8.
[8] Ardrey, R. (1966), *The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations*. New York: Atheneum.
[9] Scheflen, A.E. (1976), *Human Territories: How We Behave in Space-Time* (with N. Ashcraft). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall; Forsberg, T. (1996), 'Beyond Sovereignty,

"France is our country, but the Soviet Union is our fatherland."[10] Therefore, perceptions of natural necessity for a political unit to have a certain territorial living space should not be taken for granted. Instead, these perceptions should be considered as rhetorical means to strengthen people's loyalty towards a certain political entity. Thus, asserting territorial control is a human choice, stemming from human "intentionality"[11] instead of natural instinct; it is in Sack's words "a conscious act."[12]

2.1.1 The social construction of (non-)territorial boundaries and space

Politics is in short about relationships of power and rule.[13] Political actors have a choice to mould relationships of power and rule through territorial control or non-territorial control. Territorial boundaries are the expression of territorial control for the various dimensions of relationships of power and rule, while non-territorial boundaries are the expression of non-territorial control.[14] Boundaries indicate the political space determining who or what exercises power over whom and what. They demarcate a polity's scope, delineating how far political rule extends to enforce obedience, and when and where someone ought to obey which authority. Boundaries also indicate where an individual may count on certain political and legal treatment or receive certain benefits from the government. Furthermore, boundaries can show the inside and outside of a polity, excluding access to outsiders while functioning as identity markers for insiders' loyalties and the scope in which resources are provided.[15] Boundaries can also function as the

---

Within Territoriality: Mapping the Space of Late-Modern (Geo)Politics', in *Cooperation and Conflict*. Vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 355-386.

[10] Quoted in Kristoff, L.K.D. (1959), 'The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries', in *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*. Vol. 49, pp. 269-282, p. 279.

[11] Delaney, D. (2005), *Territory: A Short Introduction*. Malden (MA): Blackwell. p. 72.

[12] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1, p. 31.

[13] *Cf.* Ruggie, J.G. (1993), 'Territoriality and beyond', in *International Organization*. Vol. 47, no. 1, p. 151.

[14] Boundaries are used to denote political demarcation in general, while borders refer to the political demarcation only of a geographical nature. Frontiers are used to denote vaguely defined border zones.

[15] Anderson, J. (1996), 'The Shifting Stage of Politics: New Mediaeval and Postmodern Territorialities', in *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*. Vol. 14, pp. 133-153; Paasi, A. (1996), *Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border*. Chicester: John Wiley.

meeting points of adjacent polities. Boundaries do not necessarily indicate the inside and outside of a full-blown polity. Temporary prohibition of cattle transport from a certain area to contain contagious cattle disease is also an example of asserting territorial control. An area can be covered by many intersecting, overlapping boundaries for various political purposes. In other words, an area can be covered by a number of territorial strategies of control, in short a number of "political territorialities."

Being a product of political choice, so-called 'natural' boundaries are nothing else than natural features (*e.g.*, rivers, mountain ranges, skin or gender) agreed upon to be a demarcation of political control. In addition, territorial boundaries, territorial power centres and territorial peripheries are also an expression of essentially social phenomena of how political actors are related to each other. As a consequence, without continuous effort, the most 'natural' boundaries of a polity would erode. And with serious effort, the most 'unnatural', artificial boundaries may gain political meaning and significance. Although many boundaries drawn in the United States of America and Africa are of rather abstract origin, they have been increasingly seen as socially 'real', and have shaped politics ever since. Thus, drawing boundaries is of an essentially social nature. The construction and maintenance of boundaries is therefore never only a geographical or physical matter, but also a social and mental one. Boundaries are to be understood as "part of the 'discursive landscape' of social power, which is decisive in social control and the maintenance of social order."[16] In order to determine if and how territory matters in politics, requires not only a geographical analysis, but also scrutiny of the political institutions, social practices, representations, ideologies, images, discourses and symbols by which territorial demarcations are established, consolidated, and maintained. For example, political geographers like Anssi Paasi who analysed geography and history textbooks

[16] Paasi, A. (1999), 'Boundaries as Social Processes; Territoriality in a World of Flows', in D. Newman (ed.), *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*. London: Frank Cass. p. 84.

and Marcelo Escolar who looked at maps in order to see how political entities have been geographically envisioned and represented.[17]

The attention given to the social construction of territorial boundaries does not deny that the geographic environment has an impact on relationships of power and rule. The environment certainly influences boundary-making and centre-periphery relations, but it is a political choice whether and which geographical factors are used to mould political relationships.[18] Therefore, any political territory requires maintenance, as Anssi Paasi explains:

> [t]erritories are not frozen frameworks where social life occurs. Rather, they are made, given meanings, and destroyed in social and individual action. (…) Territories are always manifestations of power relations. The link between territory and power suggests that is important to distinguish between a place as territory and other types of places. Whereas most places do not, territories – especially states – require perpetual public effort to establish and to maintain.[19]

This also leads to the paradoxical notion that as a result of mutual recognition of previously contested borders, the borders became less politically relevant because they no longer require a lot of effort to protect a political unit from invasion by another political unit on the other side of the border.[20]

Any relationship of power and rule occupies a certain political space, in which the members (ought to) accept, comply with the will of, or could receive output from the rulers. This space may be territorially defined and bordered, but can also be based on functional traits, personal characteristics, or time.[21] Territorial space is based on a demarcated geographical area. That does not necessarily refer only to soil, but also to water – think of the so-

---

[17] Paasi, A. (1996), supra note 15; Escolar, M. (2003), 'Exploration, Cartography and the Modernization of State Power', in N. Brenner et al. (eds.), *State/Space: A Reader*. Malden (MA): Blackwell. pp. 29-52.
[18] Gottmann, J. (1973), supra note 4, p. 134.
[19] Paasi, A. (2003), supra note 3, p. 110-111.
[20] Diez, Th. (2006), 'The Paradoxes of Europe's Borders', in *Comparative European Politics*. Vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 235-252.
[21] Forsberg, T. (2006), supra note 9, pp. 363-364.

called 'territorial waters', and since the start of air transport also the air space above a certain geographic area.[22] A function-based space is defined by a certain policy area or occupation. Medieval guilds and task-specific jurisdictions such as school districts and water authorities are examples of function-based power and rule. Person-based space is not determined by *where* a political actor is located, *what* a political actor is doing, but *which characteristics* the political actor has. These characteristics may be based on ethnicity, gender, social status, noble blood, race, language, or kinship. This is not to deny that functional or personal space occupies a certain geographical area, but that space is not defined and delineated by territory.[23] In addition to space, time can also be used to denote which political actor is in charge. The six-monthly rotating presidency of the European Union exemplifies such a temporal limitation of political relationships.

Often, political space is defined and delineated from a combination of elements. For example, laws contain often a clause on what their functional (material), territorial, personal and temporal scope is. The regional government of Brussels also exemplifies a combination. Within the Belgian system of 'personal federalism', someone's mother tongue is the foremost determinant of the political authority a person is subjected to. French-speaking, German-speaking and Flemish-speaking people thus vote for the representative bodies of the French, German and Flemish communities, though still delineated by the territories of the respective Walloon and Flemish regional areas. Within the Brussels-region a person belongs to the French-speaking or Flemish-speaking community *irrespective* of where he or she lives in the Brussels-region.[24] To conclude, political actors are thus offered a wide variety of choices how to define, delineate and demarcate spaces of political relationships using both geographical and non-geographical elements.

Territory has been used throughout the ages to mould relationships of power and rule. For example, in the Roman Empire, provinces, regions, and

[22] Gottmann, J. (1973), supra note 4.
[23] Ruggie, J.G. (1993), supra note 13, p. 149.

pagi were geographically demarcated. Similarly, the dioceses of the Catholic Church have been demarcated geographically. Political actors may combine territorial with other non-geographical definitions of political space, witness the person-based membership of both the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. The border zones of the Roman Empire also show that territorial boundaries are not necessarily clearly demarcated as in the ideal type state. The division of Charlemagne's Empire (843) into three parts was also geographically demarcated.[25] Yet, person-based feudalism determined principally the relationships of power and rule within and over those parts. This example also illustrates that territorial boundaries are neither a new political phenomenon since the Peace Treaties of Westphalia (1648), nor inevitably lead to the creation of a Westphalian state. Political actors can choose whether they base and define power and rule on territory, whether they combine that basis and definition with personal characteristics, functional traits or time, at which scale they create a territory, whether they create one or more territories, whether they concentrate all political authority within one territory, and whether a cultural, economic, social or legal system should coincide with the territory of the political system.

2.1.2 Sack's understanding of political territoriality and its implications

To sum up thus far, the political use of territory is neither an innate instinct nor necessarily Westphalian. Moreover, boundaries can be vaguely defined or of a non-geographical nature. A definition of the political use of territory should therefore avoid any socio-biological or Westphalian bias. Robert Sack (1986) has written one of the first and few works offering a historical understanding of political territoriality that is not exclusively informed by the Westphalian state. His understanding of political territoriality is thoroughly human[26] defining it as follows: "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships,

---

[24] Brans, M. & Swenden, W. (2006), 'The Hyphenated State: Multi-Level Governance and the Communities in Belgium: the Case of Brussels', in M.D. Burgess & H. Vollaard (eds.), *European Integration and State Territoriality*. pp. 120-144.
[25] Sahlins, P. (1989), *Boundaries: the Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees*. Berkeley: University of California Press. p. 1.
[26] Delaney, D. (2005), supra note 11.

by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area" and also as "a geographical expression of power."[27] This definition clearly shows that political territoriality is a human activity used to create and mould political relationships through socially constructed territories. That may include the physical demarcation of a geographic area, as well as the establishment of coercive and socialising mechanisms and institutions to uphold territorial control.[28] According to Sack's understanding of political territoriality, territory is not a passive given, but is actively used by political actors.

Sack's definition covers a wide variety of political use of territory, ranging from nomads' temporary control of oases, and electoral districts, to the temporary control of streets in Catholic neighbourhoods by the Protestant Orange Marches in Northern-Ireland. It also includes vaguely defined boundaries such as imperial *limes* (frontiers), or the non-contiguous use of territorial control such as in mediaeval Burgundy or the Habsburgian Empire. In fact, his definition does not make a qualitative distinction between external and internal borders, meaning borders of and within the Westphalian state respectively. Internal and external borders only differ to the extent of asserting control. According to Sack's definition, Ruggie's claim that the European Union might go "beyond territoriality" is rather unlikely.[29] Territory is still used as strategy, as the Schengen border controls exemplify. However, the European Union might go beyond Westphalia, a peculiar form of territorial control.

Being a product of human intentionality, why then, would political actors use territory to shape relationships of power and rule? Political territoriality is an efficient means for classification, communication and enforcement, as Sack succinctly explains:

> Territoriality involves a form of *classification* that is extremely efficient under certain circumstances. Territoriality classifies, at least in part, by area than by type. (…) We need not stipulate the kinds of things in place that are ours or not yours. Thus territoriality avoids, to varying degrees, the need for

[27] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1, p. 19, 5.
[28] Sahlins, P. (1989), supra note 25; Paasi, A. (1996), supra note 15; Paasi, A. (2003), supra note 3.
[29] Ruggie, J.G. (1993), supra note 13.

enumeration and classification by kind and may be the only means of asserting control if we cannot enumerate all of the significant factors and relationships to which we have access. This effect is especially useful in the political arena, where a part of the political is its concern with novel conditions and relationships. Territoriality can be easy to *communicate* because it requires only one kind of marker or sign – the boundary. (…) Territoriality can be the most efficient strategy for *enforcing* control, if the distribution in space and time of the resources or things to be controlled fall well between ubiquity and unpredictability.[30]

Thus, territoriality helps facilitate the communication concerning assignment of political responsibilities and tasks, and the enforcement of political control since it is relatively easy to visualise through demarcation. Classification by territory also simplifies the planning of policy output, as territorial planning is easier to visualise and to be separate the process of planning from the actual persons, dynamics, and events within that area. This understanding of political territoriality does not include any function (such as security) in advance. Nevertheless, a territorial strategy of control may serve certain political purposes, such as security and planning, better than other strategies. The efficiency of exercising functional policy choices such as planning healthcare facilities or protecting property and persons may therefore suffer if territorial strategies for political control are less or no longer available in the European Union.

2.2 The logic of political territoriality

Although political territoriality is a product of human intentionality, it may yet have (unintended) implications for political relationships. A territorial strategy sets a certain institutional logic in motion enabling and constraining political behaviour. The more institutionalised territorial control is, the more certain patterns of behaviour within and between political systems appear. Charles Tilly concluded from his analysis of states' formation: "Statemakers did not seek to create the organization; they sought to sustain the activity." [31] By adopting certain strategies of political control, present-day polity-makers

[30] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1, p. 32; emphasis in the original.
[31] Tilly, C. (1984), *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p. 142.

may steer towards a certain type of political organisation, although they may not even be aware of that. Thus, the variation in political territoriality not only refers to its active, intentional use, but also to its salience and the subsequent (unanticipated) implications for relationships of power and rule. These implications are labelled here as "the logic of political territoriality." As stated earlier, political control is often not only based on territorial control. However, the more salient territory is, the more the logic of territoriality leaves its imprint on polities, policies and politics.

Political science research may discern the institutional tendencies influenced by territorial strategies that were not necessarily anticipated, desired, intended or considered in advance by political actors.[32] The logic of territoriality would emerge in any historical and social context when territory is used for political control, although in certain conditions that logic can develop more extensively.[33] Sack presents a list of 24 tendencies and combinations of tendencies to understand the logic of territoriality in all its facets. For the sake of clarity, these 24 are reduced here into 4 implications. Sack claims that his list of 24 tendencies is not a definitive list. Similarly, the four implications examined below do not represent necessarily a complete list but are intended to be an effective starting point to help understanding changing political territoriality in the European Union.

2.2.1 Geographical fixity

As mentioned earlier, communicating territorial control is often more efficient, because it is less complex than enumeration by kind or person and is more easy to visualise. City walls, fences, barbed wire, palisades, "no trespass" signs, border guards, ghetto walls, landmarks and boundary stones easily show the territorial circumscription of power and rule. Particularly since the sixteenth century, advanced mapping techniques of land area (sea maps had already been quite accurate) allowed envisioning territorial control at the table of generals, tax intendants, kings, administrative planners and statisticians.[34] An image of a political territory at accurate scale instead of as a

[32] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1, p. 31.
[33] Idem, p. 22.
[34] Escolar, M. (2003), supra note 17.

symbolic impression of the personal belongings of a king or the peculiarities of a region, provided a fixed geographical icon for a political system. Geographical fixity also facilitates comparison between political units regarding economic income, happiness, electoral participation or whatever else, just by counting per territory, even if the relevant political relationships are not territory-based. In addition, a single territorial reference also allows summarising succinctly complex and changing networks of political relationships. Networks of power and the rule of nations or governments can be identified as "France" or "Paris", and visualised through the image of, for example, the *hexagone*. The ease of communicating territorial control facilitates its relative permanence, also because the territorial control is not fully dependent on any change of phenomenon or persons in the demarcated area. That can lead to what might be called "fictive fixity," the idea that the territory has been there even before it was created and will be there forever. History textbooks on European nation-states often represent this de-historicising effect, in which history, present, and future is explained teleologically in the framework of a recently crafted national territory.[35]

Thus, political territoriality implies a tendency to geographical fixity of political space. This fixity may explain why territorial conflicts are the fiercest when certain territorial images overlap (see Chapter 6). Person-based or function-based strategies of political control are much less geographically fixed. In medieval times, the capriciousness of dynastic marriages, allegiances and feuds continuously influenced the geographical scope of power and rule, while function-based polities are inherently unlimited since it depends on what political actors do, often being geographically flexible in seeking the most efficient scale of operation. The tendency of geographical fixity does not mean that people would fixate exclusively on one territory. In federations, citizens may feel attached to the territory of the federation, perceiving the member state's territory as a "secondary territory."[36]

---

[35] *Cf.* Walker, R.B.J. (1993), supra note 2.

[36] Mamadouh, V. (2000), 'The Territoriality of European Integration and the Territorial Features of the European Union: The First 50 Years', in *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*. Vol. 92, no. 4, p. 423.

2.2.2 Impersonality

A territory can be used to refer to the complex networks of political relationships. It may thus become a depersonalised and reified expression of power and rule, obscuring the actual political relationships:

> Reification through territory is a means of making authority visible. Displacement through territory means having people take the visible territorial manifestations as the sources of power […] The territory is a physical manifestation of the state's authority, and yet allegiance to territory or homeland makes territory appear as a source of authority.[37]

The "iconography"[38] of a political entity often includes a territorial reference to symbolize the belonging of individuals, societies and their authorities together. Geographical fixity and impersonality may provide a "magical mystical perspective"[39] to a political entity making it seem as if it has always existed. Impersonality also features in non-territorially organised entities, such as a religious order or a company. The easy visualisation of territory, however, strengthens the impersonal nature of political relationships.

The extent as to which impersonality can work through a political entity also depends on the genesis of the territorial boundaries to demarcate the area controlled. Territorial boundaries can be the expression of the geographical spread of a previously existing political entity, which has been described by political geographer Richard Hartshorne as "subsequent boundaries."[40] In contrast to this "social definition of territory", so-called "superimposed boundaries" indicate the "territorial definition of social relationships."[41] Then, territorial boundaries are applied to mould persons and phenomena into a certain framework. Imposing territorial boundaries also creates the illusion as if persons and phenomena were not previously present in that territorial area, "emptiable space"[42] in Sack's words, and to

---

[37] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1, p. 38.
[38] Gottmann, J. (1973), supra note 4.
[39] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1.
[40] See Newman, D. (2006), 'Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue', in *European Journal of Social Theory*. Vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 171-186.
[41] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1, p. 36.
[42] Idem, p. 33.

plan regardless of these people and phenomena. Referring to the Weberian description of impersonal bureaucracy, Sack explains:

> Planning for change and thinking of the future means imagining different things in space. It involves imagining the separation and recombination of things in space. Territoriality serves as a device to keep space emptiable and fillable.[43]

An impersonal, emptiable space makes it possible for the territory to be considered as a *tabula rasa*, on which a blueprint of a new society can be projected. Particularly through city planning, political actors have tried to mould people into synoptic, transparent and controllable schemes.[44] For example, Baron Hausmann constructed a star shape pattern of streets in late 19th century Paris in order to make the city easily accessible for police and military to respond quickly to crush revolts which were more difficult to combat in the former medieval town quarters. Previously, during the French Revolution, the revolutionaries had conceived of France as a blank sheet from which they could create a fully new regime. It is for this reason that the conservative thinker Edmund Burke criticised the French Revolution, because it did not take into account the historically grown[45], illustrating the tension between socially defined territory and territorially defined society.

Superimposed and subsequent boundaries collided also in other instances. Native Americans and also African tribes were 'surprised' by European colonialists geographically delineating their property and political space.[46] A similar collision occurred in municipal redistricting in the Netherlands. Often for reasons of providing the provision of public goods at an efficient scale, the Dutch government has merged cities with their surrounding villages. The people in the villages protested particularly against this imposition of new territory, since they did not feel connected to the

---

[43] Idem, p. 38.
[44] See Scott, J.C. (1998), *Seeing like a State: how Certain Schemes to improve the Human Condition fail*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
[45] Anderson, M. (1996), *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 110.
[46] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1.

people in the city or the new territory and preferred to remain in their traditional village territories.[47]

The idea of a historical link between people and the area they live in is an important part of Ratzel's organic state theory. The idea that certain people belong to a certain geographical area is therefore referred to as 'organic territoriality.' Ratzel presented this idea as a historically and environmentally determined given. Here 'organic territoriality' refers to a socially constructed idea and perception that a political group is historically rooted to the soil they are living on. The (imagined) link between political groups and the area they live on have been influential in Catholic and Protestant political thought on states and federalism (see Chapter 3). Citizenship based on ascendancy, *ius sanguinis*, is reminiscent of this imagined link, while *ius soli* indicates that citizenship is determined by the place of birth. "Dynastic territoriality"[48] is another example of subsequent boundaries. For a long period, the ups and downs of royal, imperial, clerical and princely dynasties determined the geographical scope of power and rule in Europe. Notwithstanding the personal origin of subsequent borders, the very use of territory to express the relationships of power and rule of communities, dynasties, nations or empires will have a similar, yet weaker effect upon the functioning of the political system as superimposed borders. For example, geographical fixity and impersonality increasingly have marked the power and the rule of dynasties in Europe so that at one point the death of a king no longer changed borders and a political system under the exclamation: "the king is dead, long live the king."

Another example of subsequent territorial boundaries is 'imperial territoriality.' An empire is rather a person-based polity, being foremost based on a civilisation of values. Imperial boundaries are therefore vaguely delineated, relatively unfixed, transitional temporary zones (in short: frontiers). Frontiers indicate the temporary reach of coercion and persuasion

---

[47] See Vollaard, H. (2007), 'Het Absorptievermogen van de Europese Unie', in H. Vollaard & J. Penders (eds.), *De Spankracht van de Europese Unie*. Utrecht: Lemma. pp. 67-96.

[48] Teschke, B. (2002), 'Theorising the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism', in *European Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 8, no. 1, p. 21.

of the civilisation's values, reflecting the cultural fringes of an imperial civilisation, they are "rather a phenomenon of 'the facts of life'- a manifestation of the spontaneous tendency for growth of the ecumene."[49] The marches or borderlands of an empire are the temporary cultural, economic and military front of the empire. Frontiers are therefore outer-oriented, for values are essentially unbounded and geographically non-fixed, while political actors' interests in the transitional zone may runaway from the civilisation's centre of the empire, being a "manifestation of centrifugal forces."[50] An ancient example of imperial territoriality is the Roman Empire in its expansive period. Modern "spheres of influence" and "spheres of responsibility" in international politics feature the geographical scope of a great power's authority integrating certain countries or regions into a loose political system.[51] The 1823 Monroe Doctrine, in which United States President James Monroe justified the influence of the United States within the Western Hemisphere, and Russia's "Near Abroad" exemplify imperial territoriality.

2.2.3 Geographical exclusivity/ inclusion

In contrast to frontiers, borders are rather precisely defined, linear and well-demarcated lines, indicating the "outerline of effective control exercised by the central government."[52] Boundaries do not necessarily seal off a political system, but rather function as 'filters' or 'screening instruments' to regulate access to and exit from a political system, often differentiating between members and non-members.[53] For example, tourists may be allowed to enter a state's territory only temporarily, while a state's citizens may stay indefinitely. An "'open border' situation refers to a centrifugal orientation of

[49] Kristof, L. (1959), supra note 10, p. 270.
[50] Idem, p. 272.
[51] Kratochwil, F. (1986), 'Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System', in *World Politics*. Vol. 34, pp. 27-52; Tunander et al. (eds.) (1997), *Geopolitics in Post-War Europe: Security, Territory and Identity*. London: Sage.
[52] Kristof, L. (1959), supra note 10, p. 272.
[53] Anderson, J. & O'Dowd, L. (1999), 'Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance', in *Regional Studies*. Vol. 33, no. 7, p. 596; Gottmann, J. (1973), supra note 4, p. 138.

the actors contained within the borders"[54], in which territory functions as "springboard of opportunity" for, for instance, trade across its borders.[55] The more closed a boundary is, the more it interrupts cross-boundary contacts, and the more actors within boundary areas are bound to turn to the central authority in their political area for value satisfaction. The stricter the boundary control, the less permeable it is, the stronger the focus is on the internal centre: "The centripetal effect of [closed] borders [is] the orientation towards the interior of the people inhabiting the enclosed territory."[56] Thus, closed linear territorial boundaries function as "locking-in mechanisms" with a separating, "inner-oriented" impact, being "a manifestation of centripetal forces."[57] These linear boundaries create a situation of peripherality for those members close to the boundaries since the centre's tight grip prevents exchanges across those boundaries. The other side of external exclusion is, however, the internal inclusion of those peripheries.

The political territoriality of closed borders has a separating tendency, dividing an inside from an outside, shaping the political relationships within and between territories. Peter Taylor has captured that internal and external shaping in the concepts of "containers" and "interterritoriality", respectively.[58] In the formation of states in Europe, territorial boundaries have functioned internally as a "container" in which military, political, but also economic, cultural and social relations are bundled, as has been the case with the creation of identity within state boundaries: "territoriality is connected both with the creation of state boundaries (exclusion of the Other) and with internal social-spatial control (the social construction of

[54] Houtum, H. van (1998), *The Development of Cross-Border Economic Relations.* Dissertation KUB Tilburg. p. 16.
[55] Gottmann, J. (1973), supra note 4, p. 14.
[56] Houtum, van (1998), supra note 54, p. 16; emphasis in the original.
[57] Bartolini, S. (2005), *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring between the Nation-State and the European Union.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 13; Kristof, L. (1959), supra note 10, p. 272.
[58] Taylor, P.J. (1994), 'The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World-System', in *Progress in Human Geography.* Vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 151-162; Taylor, P.J. (1995), 'Beyond Containers: Internationality, Interstateness, Interterritoriality', in *Progress in Human Geography.* Vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1-15.

'us')."[59] Mercantilist, protectionist, and especially autarkic economic regimes, strongly emphasize the closing of territorial boundaries around an economic system. Politically and administratively, closed boundaries concentrate the decision-making, planning and execution of tasks within the territory. These may include, the right to participate in decision-making, the circumscription of formal competences, the right of receiving, consuming and producing social benefits, and the persons and other factors that planners must take into account.[60] In the Middle Ages jurisdiction seemed to resemble ink blobs on the map, in part for being determined by person-based power and rule. Instead, a closed territory fostered a territorial and thus contiguous image of power and rule. Increasing coincidence and congruence of territorialities within the political realm, but also of social, economic and cultural territorialities can be called 'bundling territorialities', while the decreasing coincidence and congruence is 'unbundling territorialities.'[61] The latter does not necessarily mean that territoriality is no longer used as strategy, but that the ex/inclusive impact of territorial boundaries is for some reason weaker since territorialities coincide less.

The closed territorial boundaries of one political entity also affect relations with political actors on the other side of the boundaries. An entity's territorial integrity requires recognition from the outside. The territorial exclusion and concentration of political life within a territory, also implies the acceptance of politics outside the territory. Imperial territoriality considers frontiers just as a temporary dividing line between the civilisation and the inferior barbarians outside, which are to be subjected to the economic, military and cultural will of the empire as soon as it is able and willing to do so.[62] The demarcation of the outer-line of effective control implies, however, the recognition of the right of existence of political entities outside the territory. In other words, a closed boundary stimulates, but also

---

[59] Paasi, A. (1996), 'Inclusion, Exclusion and Territorial Identities: The Meanings of Boundaries in the Globalizing Geopolitical Landshape', at *www.kultgeog.uu.se/paasi23.html* (accessed on 18 April 2000).
[60] *Cf.* Leibfried, S. & Pierson, P. (1995), 'Semisovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in a Multitiered Europe', in S. Leibfried & P. Pierson (eds.), *European Social Policy: between Fragmentation and Integration.* Washington DC: Brookings. pp. 50ff.
[61] *Cf.* Ruggie, J.G. (1993), supra note 13.

requires, mutual recognition of territorial integrity. Because of this mutual nature of interterritoriality, "[t]erritories do not exist in isolation.…"[63] The mutual recognition of territories came about in Europe from a stalemate between clashing religions and between the geopolitical aggrandizement of competing dynasties and expanding nations. The numerous agreements and treaties made to maintain the mutual recognition of territories also show the inherent normative nature of the society of territory-based political units.

The image of a territorially delineated political unit is rather easy to visualise, to communicate and to imitate. Sack speaks in this respect of territoriality's tendency to "engender more territoriality"[64], as a white spot on the map asking to be filled, making today's world a map to be carved up in territorial units. Once fixated, these territorial units are also relatively difficult to change. Interterritoriality implies that a government can only be meaningful if it holds a claim on a territory, even if it is in exile or lacks effective control. Claims for national self-determination or regional autonomy are often expressed in territorial terms to facilitate communication and recognition. The Convention of Montevideo (1933) is usually referred to as the legal norm of an acknowledgement of a government by fellow governments in order to become a legitimate participant. In the convention, effective control of territory is a key criterion. The more the mutual exclusivity of territories is emphasised in this society of governments, the stronger territorial borders are, and the more political life will be concentrated within a territory. A certain measure of impermeability of territorial borders is thus fundamental to the "containership" within a political territory, and interterritoriality in inter-polity relationships. As a matter of fact, wherever territorial boundaries are set, containership and interterritoriality appear. Not only in inter-state relations, but also at the municipal, provincial or regional level the same effect will occur if territory is used as a means of control. As stated before, so-called internal borders within states and external borders of states do not differ qualitatively.

---

[62] *Cf.* Kratochwil, F. (1986), supra note 51, p. 32.
[63] Taylor, P.J. (1995), supra note 58, p. 3.
[64] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1, p. 34.

Non-territorial boundaries can also have an exclusionary and inclusive influence. Being relatively easy to communicate and enforce, the impact of territorial boundaries are however expected to be stronger than non-territorial boundaries. Blocking physical access and communication infrastructure to cut off contacts across territorial borders can be more effectively enforced than blocking contact across personal or functional borders. Pre-1991 Albania and present-day North Korea are examples of this effective enforcement. This territorial effectiveness is also shown in political relationships in which person-based separation is sought, such as in the homelands under the South-African Apartheid regime or ghettos in cities. Although the previous discussion of containership and interterritoriality suggest otherwise, closed borders do not necessarily lead to the creation of a society of states. The Iron Curtain exemplified a closed boundary, but it reflected the stalemate between the Soviet and American spheres of influence in Europe. Thus, the genesis of this boundary impacts on the tendency towards further ex/inclusion.

2.2.4 Geographical centrality

As pointed out earlier, the exclusionary impact of territorially closed boundaries has a centripetal effect. This is not only the way political territoriality fosters geographical centrality. Enforcing control through political territoriality is usually less labour intensive and easier to visualise than person-based or function-based control. Territoriality provides an effective disciplinary instrument for surveillance from a hierarchic centre, as centralised supervision requires relatively few guards within a clearly visualised area to keep outsiders out and insiders down.[65] Political territoriality also facilitates the assignment of tasks and responsibilities, because these are relatively easy to visualise through a boundary. Enumeration by kind or person would make it much more complex and less easy to visualise (and thus communicate) who or what is responsible and accountable. In addition, bundling of territorialities requires coordination and priority setting among the various functions bundled in a political

[65] Idem.

centre. The more political territoriality influences political behaviour, the stronger its exclusionary and centralising effect. As a consequence, the political centre can begin to dominate priority setting and coordination, becoming the primary power within the 'bundled' territory. A capital can be seen as the geographical visualisation of this centralised, fixed, impersonal, and exclusive power.

As has been previously stated, territoriality is a relatively efficient way of communicating accountability and planning the delivery of goods. Territorial planning and accountability are, however, efficient only to a certain extent. Mismatch between the actual scale of human activities and social dynamics on the one hand, and the scale of planning and accountability on the other hand, causes spill-over effects, blurring of responsibility and hampering the efficient provision of public services. Furthermore, too much centralised power within a territory may lack the flexibility and the necessary expertise in certain policy areas to deal with cases of mismatch. That mismatch may yet be maintained on purpose to divert attention from the real origins of certain phenomena or social conflict.[66] In addition, mismatch between territory and function may also be pursued in order to fragment power, such as in the federal systems of government in the USA and (West) Germany.

Cases of mismatch can be solved by creating task-specific, one-purpose jurisdictions, flexibly adjusting to the most efficient scale of operation.[67] This task-driven logic is a functional one, resulting in geographically overlapping jurisdictions.[68] The choice between territorially bundling tasks or functionally unbundling tasks depends on the following reasoning:

…we find that government's role in providing public goods territorially is explained in two ways. First, it is pointed out that externalities tend to be contiguous in geographic space. But this contiguity in space is more likely a

[66] Idem, p. 39.
[67] Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2003), 'Unraveling the Central State, but how? Types of Multi-level Governance', in *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 233-243.
[68] *Cf.* Frey, B.S. & Eichenberger, R. (1999), *The New Democratic Federalism for Europe: Functional, Overlapping, and Competing Jurisdictions*. Cheltenham: Elgar.

result of the fact that public goods are provided territorially. The second reason is therefore more fundamental. It argues that public goods are provided by political territorial units because they can levy taxes to support them while attempting to contain or exclude externalities and free riders. (…) Many services are not completely independent of one another and can benefit by sharing boundaries with services that might theoretically have somewhat different geographical ranges. (…) It may pay, therefore, to have them all share boundaries in a multi-purpose district.[69]

Expanding on this way of reasoning, the political scientists Liesbeth Hooghe and Gary Marks advance another argument on the size and diversity of political systems with regard to the choice mentioned above:

Large (i.e., territorially extensive) jurisdictions have the virtue of exploiting economies of scale in the provision of public goods, internalizing policy externalities, allowing for more efficient taxation, facilitating more efficient redistribution, and enlarging the territorial scope of security and market exchange. Large jurisdictions are bad when they impose a single policy on diverse ecological systems or territorially heterogeneous populations.[70]

A multi-purpose jurisdiction is an instrument used not only to bundle accountability and coordinated planning, but also to share risks. Fiscal centralisation is there to share the financial burden of risks and coordination costs among participating one-purpose jurisdictions. Conflicts concerning the redistribution of tax resources may result in further centralisation. This centralised bargaining is effectively the centralisation of interest aggregation. The subsequent centralisation is enhanced furthermore, since it requires from the members of a multi-purpose polity more effort to escape to another multi-purpose polity or a variety of one-purpose polities, than to voice its demands and grievances within the more fixed, institutionalised framework of a territorial, multi-purpose polity (see below and Chapter 4). This incentive to stay within the territorial, multi-purpose polity allows for the creation of a common identity with an exclusionary effect: others do not enjoy the provision of services, nor do they share the members' identity.[71]

[69] Sack, R. (1986), supra note 1, pp. 158-159.
[70] Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2003), supra note 67, p. 235.
[71] Idem, p. 237.

The mobility of members belonging to a multi-purpose polity would then be largely contained within its territorial confines. The stronger the borders of a (multi-purpose) polity are, the less easy it is to redraw them. Municipal borders are therefore in general easier to redraw than national borders.

'Functional territoriality' refers to the strategy to draw territorial borders according to the geographical scale of a certain function. It is thus a mechanical or instrumental definition of territory (in contrast to the social definition of territory in organic territoriality). A functional logic of organisation is exemplified in David Mitrany's "aterritorial logic of functionalism"[72] found in EU integration theories. Mitrany, the intellectual father of functionalism, expects that a world organised according to task-specific issue-arenas would destroy the exclusionary tendencies of the territorial nation-states. However, co-ordination among policy arenas and endurable structures of accountability also require a (territorial) centralising of the bundling of tasks.[73] The distribution of tasks across several levels has consequently been discussed among the European Communities and its successors on the basis of efficiency of scale and (democratic) accountability. This debate on efficiency of geographical scale has also been marked by 'organic' attachments to (national) territories, which are not necessarily improvements for an efficient allocation of values or an effective organisation of accountability and democracy. As mentioned previously, similar discussions on territoriality, functionality and personality are common in municipal redistricting, in which the need for an efficient scale of public service provision, the attachment to local neighbourhoods and central coordination and accountability not always go together.

2.2.5 Anarchy, functional differentiation and (geographical) distance

In short, indicating variation in political territoriality is a matter of the salience of territorial control in behaviour and institutions, and the subsequent tendencies of geographical fixity, impersonality, exclusivity and centrality –the logic of political territoriality. Closed territorial borders

[72] Chryssochoou, D. (2001), *Theorizing European Integration*. London: Sage. p. 42.
[73] *Cf.* Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2003), supra note 67.

enhance the logic of territoriality, in its extreme resulting in geographically fixed, impersonal, mutually exclusive, and centralised political systems. As the principle of territoriality is the basis for power and rule of the ideal type Westphalian system of states, the ideal type state and political territoriality are closely connected; the state is an extreme example of territoriality and its logic (see also Chapter 3). Conceptualising political territoriality as a strategy plus implications instead of a principle provides a more refined vocabulary to map discontinuities in political space, while avoiding the territorial trap. Ruggie's call for such a vocabulary resulted from his reflections on the theory of international politics launched by Kenneth Waltz in 1979.[74] Ruggie contested Waltz "ahistorical" assumption of a hierarchical Westphalian state, leading to the latter's thesis that the international system is anarchic, effectively forcing the states to remain as they are. Waltz' theory could therefore not account for the transformation from the anarchic Medieval Europe harbouring a wide variety of function-based guilds, territorial princedeoms, person-based allegiance to feudal lords and popes towards the modern system of states. Neither could Waltz' theory address the potential change of the international system beyond Westphalian territoriality. The Sack-based conceptualisation offers a vocabulary to indicate fundamental changes in (international) politics.

As mentioned above, closed territorial borders enhance the logic of territoriality, in its extreme resulting in geographically fixed, impersonal, mutually exclusive, and centralised political systems. The ideal type Westphalian state is an extreme example of territoriality and its logic. It is therefore the logic of territoriality, rather than anarchy which is responsible for maintaining states in international politics. The anarchic nature of international politics is a result of the logic of territoriality *in extremis*. In order to explain the constitution of a (non-)Westphalian order in politics it is necessary to explain when and how political territoriality has been adopted and (both internally and externally) accepted as a feasible strategy and principle of polity-formation, and how the logic of political territoriality could work to its extreme. This may be a conceptual starting point to help

[74] Waltz, K.N. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*. Readings (MA): Addison-Wesley.

explain the systemic transformation from the mediaeval to the Westphalian order to the post-modern era beyond that Ruggie has been looking for.[75]

Waltz claims that because no central power can force states to cooperate across their borders permanently, states should help themselves, and thus become like-units, without functional differentiation among them. An explanation of systemic change might however begin from the starting point that the less salient territorial control is, the less the logic of territoriality can work through political life, the more functional differentiation might be expected (unless segmental differentiation takes place on a non-territorial base). Therefore, explaining systemic change would require understanding the circumstances and reasons political actors use territoriality, and the circumstances in which its logic can work through.

A similar argument can apply to intra-territorial politics. When power is geographically fixed, centralised, exclusively held and bundled in a polity, its members have one point where to address their demands and grievances, to coordinate and negotiate the allocation of values. Thus, the fixity, exclusivity and centrality of a territory-based polity decrease the costs, while they increase the effectiveness of cross-local mobilisation of functional and personal demands from the entire territory (see Chapter 4). As the Rokkanian argument goes, the relatively closed territorial borders of the European states allowed for the formation of national parties and movements.[76] Thus, a strong logic of territoriality weakens geographically organised and expressed representation. If, however, power is flexibly located, dispersed, decentralised, unbundled, and non-exclusive, members have multiple points where to direct their demands and grievances. Then, cross-local mobilisation of demands across the entire territory of the political system will be more costly and less effective, since multiple authorities have to be addressed and members are fractured according to the fragmented authorities. Instead of territory-wide, polity-wide mobilisation of demands, members of a political system would seek the address for their demands with

[75] Ruggie, J.G. (1993), supra note 13.
[76] See Rokkan, S. (1999), *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan* (edited by P. Flora, S. Kuhnle & D.Urwin). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

those whom they feel enough of a bond to come together in a common effort. This might be based on religion, ethnicity, kinship, race or any other source of mutual trust. The expectation of being locked in a fixed territorial system would thus be exchanged with the conviction of belonging to the same group, sharing the same interests, or identity. Geographical proximity is however helpful in order to decrease the costs for mobilising demands. In addition, coordination of some tasks may yet be feasible at close geographical distance. The paradoxical implication is that while a strong logic of territoriality stimulates the non-territorial representation of demands, a weak logic of territoriality seems to foster a geographical representation of demands.

A strong logic of territoriality at national level would thus limit functional differentiation in the international sphere, while fostering functional differentiation within states. In contrast, a weak logic of territoriality fosters functional differentiation in the international sphere, while fostering foremost the geographical concentration of politics within states. In principle, territoriality and its logic applies to all levels and scope of politics, whether municipal, national, regional, international or worldwide. It thus offers the conceptual vocabulary of (territorial) political strategies and polity-formation that is independent of the territorial divide between Comparative Politics and International Relations. The more intense the logic of territoriality at national level, the more justified the territorial between CP and IR is.

2.3 Tracing changing political territoriality

The variation in political territoriality among political units can be shown by the salience of territorial control and the subsequent logic of territoriality. If rulers resort to non-territorial means of control, communication, classification and enforcement, or citizens no longer stick to the territorial delineation then a process of de-territorialisation takes place. As shown by the various examples provided, political territoriality is not the only means of control. Nevertheless, the more emphasis on the territory, the more the logic of political territoriality of geographical fixity, impersonality, exclusivity and

centrality marks and prevails in political institutions and behaviour. That may yet be a loose yardstick for indicating the variability of political territoriality, but it is an improvement when compared with just assuming Westphalian territoriality.

Many states are legally based on the principle of territoriality, making the logic of territoriality effectively established in the states' constitutional order. However, this does not necessarily imply that political actors adopt this territory-based order in their ideas (such as self-definition and role conception) or behaviour. In his book *Organized Hypocrisy*, Stephen Krasner has pointed out that notwithstanding the highly appraised, heavily entrenched and enduring norms of territorial sovereignty, states' governments and their citizens often defy these territorial norms in daily life.[77] A contrasting example is the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain between West-Germany and East-Germany. After the wall fell and the curtain was torn down in 1989 and Germany unified in 1990, East and West Germans have kept using this border in their self-definition (the so-called *Mauer im Kopf*) and behaviour.[78] Thus, political territoriality enshrined in legal documents does not necessarily coincide with the ideas and actual behaviour of authorities and members of political systems and vice versa. Determining the extent in which political territoriality matters in political institutions should therefore not only be based on legal documents but also be expressed in terms of its institutional strength and impact.

The way in which Stephen Krasner describes institutional impact and strength is helpful in this regard.[79] "Institutional depth" refers to the degree institutional arrangements (*in casu*, political territoriality) are of any impact, indicating the "vertical conformity" between those arrangements and the behaviour of political actors (authorities, members and actors from the system's environment). An example of how deep the logic of territoriality has influenced actual behaviour can be found among the local entrepreneurs in

[77] Krasner, S.D. (1999), *Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
[78] Meinhof, U.H. (2004), 'Europe viewed from below: Agents, Victims, and the Threat of the Other', in R. Herrmann, T. Risse & M. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*. Lanham (MD): Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 214-244.
[79] Krasner, S.D. (1988), 'Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective', in *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 66-94.

the Dutch-Belgian and Dutch-German border regions. They still think and act as if the national borders are there, although European cross-border arrangements eliminated these borders. The entrepreneurs' behaviour exemplifies the previously inward-looking and mutually exclusive nature of the national border, focusing on their respective national centres (political and commercial) in which the institutional and physical infrastructures have been directed.[80] The logic of political territoriality could thus be relevant, even though it is no longer formally enshrined. This example also illustrates the fixity of a territory's imprint.

An increasing number of cross-border contacts do not necessarily make the borders insignificant. As markers of differences between polities, borders also invite, for instance, smugglers, tax evaders and traders to profit from those differences by crossing the border. Cross-border communication and behaviour is not antithetical to political territoriality per se. The Internet has helped to strengthen the virtual bonds between the migrant diaspora and their homeland, instead of making territory and borders of less significance.[81] It is rather "transcendence" and negligence of borders, indicating that political behaviour is not tied at all to territory.[82] Tracing political territoriality therefore also requires the empathetic understanding of actors' perceptions and behaviour to see whether and how territorial norms influence them. Searching territoriality's depths consequently involves empirical sources in which norms are laid down (such as legal and administrative documents), as well as accounts of actors' perceptions, imaginations and behaviour in which they express the extent territorial norms matter (such as interviews).

The logic of political territoriality is institutionally strong if it is heavily embedded in, interlinked with and underpinned by other (politico-legal)

---

[80] Houtum, H. van (1998), supra note 54.
[81] Hassner, P. (1997), 'Obstinate and Obsolete: Non-Territorial Transnational Forces versus the European Territorial State', in Tunander et al. (eds) (1997), *Geopolitics in Post-War Europe: Security, Territory and Identity*. London: Sage. p. 55.
[82] Scholte, J.A. (1997), 'Global Capitalism and the State', in *International Affairs*. Vol. 73, no. 3, p. 431; Scholte, J.A. (2000), *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke: MacMillan. p. 48.

institutions, its material environment, and common ideas.[83] For example, if political territoriality is laid down in a constitution or international treaties, territoriality is strongly institutionalised (at least, as long as the law is considered resilient and significant). Amending a constitution or treaties involves quite some effort. Krasner calls this "horizontal linkage" between political territoriality and other institutions, material environment and ideas, "breadth": Breadth refers to the number of links that a particular activity has with other activities, to the number of changes that would have to be made if a particular form of activity were altered.[84] The breadth of institutionalised political territoriality may be determined by the coincidence and congruence of territorialities ("bundling") for various political functions.

Horizontal linkage of institutionalised territoriality also refers to the material and social environment in which political systems are embedded. According to Ruggie, the current cultural and artistic perceptions of reality - constructs of meaning and significance ("social epistemes") - are increasingly characterised by "post-modernity," "multi-perspectivity," "fragmentation," and "de-centring."[85] Ruggie therefore anticipates that the centralising and exclusionary nature of state territoriality would lose its significance, since political systems are embedded in these fragmentary and decentralising epistemes. Similar arguments have been raised in the current reconstruction of views of space and time (see below) and the conception of absolute property in a time of unlimitedly shareable knowledge. Changing modes of production (the replacement of mass industries by flexible services and a knowledge economy), changing warfare (long-distance weaponry, global terrorism), changing perceptions of the world (perceived from space as one unit), the increasing speed and volume of world-wide travelling, changing technologies to transcend geographical space through satellite television and Internet, indicate changing conceptions of space captured in concepts like "space-time compression" and the move from the "space of places" to the

[83] *Cf.* Ruggie, J.G. (1993), supra note 13.
[84] Krasner, S.D. (1988), supra note 80, p. 74.
[85] Ruggie, J.G. (1993), supra note 13.

"space of flows."[86] It is likely that both changing technologies and spatial conceptions will influence the way political actors conceptualise and organise political life. Nevertheless, depending on the depth and breadth of institutionalisation of territorial control, the logic of territoriality is expected to leave a certain imprint on political life.

Although the primary focus of this book is about European integration and changing political territoriality, the wider social-institutional embeddedness of political systems is of utmost relevance to the tracing of changing political territoriality; foremost, to the researcher himself. As many others have done in the field of political geography and geopolitics, Alexander Murphy claims that "the modern territorial order pervades so much of our lives that we rarely even think about its role in shaping our spatial (political, cultural, and economic) imaginations."[87] Since every researcher is (unconsciously) working within certain epistemes and institutions, he/she can - without knowing it - reproduce certain spatial images of political life and remain unaware of shifts in the geographical configurations of politics. Because certain territorial images are so deeply embedded in practices of political research, doubts exist whether observing changing political territoriality is possible at all.[88]

The widely held assumption of Westphalian territoriality by many has made problematic tracing the logic of political territoriality in political institutions. A great deal of empirical material on (political) behaviour is still territorially collected and presented, and can therefore be 'misleading' in its illustration of the extent in which borders affect the behaviour of political actors. Researching the relation between globalisation and state territoriality,

[86] Kobrin, S.J. (1998), 'Back to the Future: Neomedievalism and the Posmodern Digital World', in *Journal of International Affairs*. Vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 361-386; Harvey, D. (1989), *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford: Blackwell; Castells, M. (1996), *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.
[87] Murphy, A. (1996), 'The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations', in T.J. Biersteker & C. Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 103.
[88] Albert, M. (2002), 'On Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity: An International Relations Perspective', in D. Newman (ed.), *Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity*. London: Frank Cass. p. 61.

Jan Aart Scholte therefore takes issue with "methodological territorialism", which is:

> …the practice of understanding the social world and conducting studies about it through the lens of territorial geography. Territorialist method means formulating concepts and questions, constructing hypotheses, gathering and interpreting empirical evidence, and drawing conclusions all in a territorial spatial framework. These habits are so engrained in prevailing methodology that most social researchers reproduce them unconsciously. Methodological territorialism lies at the heart of mainstream conceptions of geography, economy, governance, community and society.[89]

Methodological territorialism seriously complicates the collection and interpretation of data, for it presents globalisation and state territoriality as a zero-sum game. However, as Saskia Sassen discusses in relation to state territoriality and financial globalisation: "we cannot simply assume that because a transaction takes place in national territory and in a national institutional setting it is ipso facto intelligible in the terms of the national."[90] Then, the question is how to avoid an uncritical reproduction of the spatial images behind certain data collection?

As mentioned before, the starting point of any political research should be the relationship of power and rule. The scale and scope of political relationships to be studied are essentially an analytical choice. It is similar to the argument made by David Easton when confronted with new de-colonised states in the 1960s. He put forward a few general criteria to distinguish a political system, in which human interaction is more or less related "to the authoritative allocation of values for a society."[91] This analytical concept would allow comparative analysis between older and newer states, as well as non-state polities. Although he himself acknowledges that his criteria are still rather close to the state, his attempt to avoid state-thinking should be appreciated. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach

[89] Scholte, A.J. (2000), supra note 83, p. 56.
[90] Sassen, S. (2000), 'Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization', in *Public Culture*. Vol. 12, no. 1, p. 228.
[91] Easton, D. (1965) *A Framework for Analysis*. Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Prentice-Hall. p. 50.

discuss and compare a wide variety of ancient and new polities, which they define as follows: "a polity (…) has a distinct identity; a capacity to mobilise persons and their resources for political purposes; that is, for value satisfaction; and a degree of institutionalization and hierarchy (leaders and constituents)."[92] Their conception of polity also includes those based on non-legitimate authority, perceiving politics as an "exchange phenomenon", as an "exchange of loyalties and resources on the one hand and value satisfaction on the other."[93] For analytical reasons, it may thus be relevant not to limit an analysis of European politics to the formal membership of the European Union, but also to include Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, candidate-members and illegal residents. An analytical study of a polity will require a thorough, elaborate and time-consuming review and examination of much (statistical) data as well as research. Already, historic and political geographic research has often taken cities, world-systems, regions, and metropolitan networks as the more relevant unit of analysis to avoid a view of historical and present developments distorted by a state-biased spatial format.

This study keeps a distance from a post-structuralist overemphasis of the significance of reproductive discourse in researching political territoriality. Although even an insignificant researcher like me may shape or maintain a certain image of reality by publishing a study on changing political territoriality, his interpretations may flounder on material realities. In addition, misinterpretation of collectively shared social facts in the cases studied is quite possible because of limits in cognitive capacities, time and energy. The idea of misinterpretation shows that he might err on (intersubjective) facts, and is not unconsciously reproducing value-laden discourse on political territoriality.[94] The unobservability of intersubjective facts (has anybody ever seen a state or any other institution?) requires a researcher's constant reflection and critical distance towards the sources

[92] Ferguson, Y.H. & Mansbach, R.W. (1996), *Polities: Authority, Identities, and Change.* Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. p. 34.
[93] Idem, p. 36.
[94] Unless the concept of misinterpretation is a hegemonic imposition by the discursive powerful; but that is a linguistic issue that requires another dissertation.

explored. Indeed, data and scale of analysis are partly based on how political actors understand the allocation and acceptance of a political system. But political actors interviewed are not necessarily aware of the political system they are part of, or of the (weakening) impact of political territoriality and its logic on their and others behaviour, ideas and material environment. Thus tracing political territoriality also takes a distance from materialist views. Although actors interviewed are unaware of material (im)possibilities for territorial control, that may still matter as to the extent in which political territoriality marks political institutions. The tracing of political territoriality's impact should include both social and material sources. The tracing of the institutionalised logic of territoriality thus subscribes to the principles of what Del Casino et al. (2000) label as "critical realism" in political geography.[95] Critical realism perceives political organisations, relations and behaviour as produced both by technological mechanisms and material environment, as well as social structures such as ideas and institutions. Research methods of material and social facts may yet require different methodologies; explaining the material possibilities for political territoriality while interpreting meaning and significance of territorial ideas, institutions and behaviour, respectively.

2.4 Time and territory

Ruggie argues that the current change in political territoriality may indicate a transformation not just of political organisation.[96] Changing political territoriality is in his view part and parcel of larger social reconstructions of time and space in the political, but also cultural, administrative, economic, legal, and security sphere. According to Ruggie, changing political territoriality may well be both a product and an expression of the "epochal change" from modernity to post-modernity. Although this epochal change can only cursorily be touched upon here, it is of relevance for research on

[95] Del Casino Jr., V.J. et.al. (2000), 'Methodological Frameworks for the Geography of Organizations', in *Geoforum*. Vol. 31, pp. 523-538.
[96] Ruggie, J.G. (1998), *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. London: Routledge.

changing political territoriality. Reflections on potential shifts in fundamental social epistemes not only reveal often implicit linkages between ethics, political organisation and its analysis, but also challenge the ontological and epistemological premises of research. The focus of this section is on these linkages and challenges, and not on what exactly would qualify as an epochal change to post-modernity and whether it is taking place. This is not only because of a lack of space, but also because of the researcher's modesty, whether it is possible to see epochal change in currently unfolding occurrences and events.

Ruggie has not been the only one to claim that the shift from the Westphalian order to post-modernity heralds a new era of temporal and spatial underpinnings of political organisation and imagination. Particularly, the speed of information and communication technology has evoked claims that geography (and territory) would no longer matter. Instead, time is becoming fundamental to politics, as political geographer John Agnew claims:

> As speed conquers time, terrestrial space ceases to have significance. What is often meant by this is not the eroding significance of just physical geography, but geography as expressed in the territories of states.[97]

However, "chronopolitics" is not necessarily antithetical to "geopolitics."[98] Certain organisation and conceptions of time allow for certain organisation and imagination of geography and the other way around. The tracing of changing political territoriality may therefore not only reveal something about the functioning of political systems, but also of the constructs of time. As a matter of fact, Ruggie referred to the European Union in particular as a one of the most relevant instances of changing spatial and temporal constructs. Magnus Jerneck also emphasises this linkage between Europeanisation, territoriality and time:

---

[97] Agnew, J. (2000), 'Global Political Geography beyond Geopolitics', in *International Studies Review*. Vol. 2, no. 1, p. 93.
[98] Forsberg, T. (1996), supra note 9.

When dealing with the EU as a system of political and social action, defined by the means of territoriality and function, it is also important to view politics in temporal terms. The basic intellectual concept of political time denotes a crucial, yet remarkably underresearched field of inquiry in European affairs.[99]

Analysing political territoriality gives a hint of changing political temporality. For instance, the previously defined logic of territoriality comprises a temporal dimension. Geographical fixity and hard borders are not just geographical expressions, but refer also to their existence over time, their endurance. Geographical fixity also allows for reifying claims on the history of the political system, as if 'it' preserved the same identity within its territory over a very long time. For example, many school textbooks present national histories based on what accidentally happened in a very distant past at particular geographical locations as if they form coherent and teleological stories towards modern states. As said before, stories and statistics framed through national territory may therefore require some reconstruction to avoid taking the geographical fixity of political systems for granted, leading to misinterpretation of political reality.

That is not to say that linear boundaries did not apply at all in pre-modern, mediaeval times. The split of Charlemagne's empire was exercised through a careful territorial demarcation of the three parts, and many conflicts occurred on the territorial range of knights' authority.[100] However, jurisdictions were not based on territory, but referred to a bunch of rights over people and wealth. Notions of rights as well as property were not about full, direct and exclusive hold, but rather of a conditional nature. The only unconditional owner of the world was God, who made the peoples and their rulers. Authority was thus derived from heaven, and political community on earth had to be focused on heavenly afterlife.

[99] Jerneck, M. (2000), 'Europeanization, Territoriality and Political Time', in *Yearbook of European Studies*, Vol. 14, p. 28.
[100] Sahlins, P. (1989), supra note 25, pp. 4-7.

As deputies of God on earth, emperors, kings and popes debated continuously about who bore responsibility for the believers' souls.[101] Believers themselves considered how to earn a ticket to heaven. Based on the work by St. Augustine, some christians pled for withdrawal from sinful politics all together to devote life to God and heaven. Others argued that believers would fulfil the requirements by doing works of mercy in the earthly political-religious community. Briefly summarised, the Christian civilisation of the Middle Ages featured a temporal focus on afterlife, and a person-based authority through a direct link to God (emperors and bishops) or mediation (ordinary people). These authority links explained the organic terms of the body, emphasising its person-based character. Believers had to accept the God-given natural order of this authority. Natural seasons and soil were to be accepted by the mediaeval religious-political communities (think of the Breviary). The geography of political systems was a result of this person-based authority and not fundamental to it.

Within this political constellation, competition remained between emperors, popes, and kings on the question who was entitled to lead the defence of the Christian faith. Paris-based kings challenged the pope and emperor by claiming universal say in religious matters within the French areas. This competition became further problematised when more cities and regional princes started to protest against imperial and papal interference in the way they worshipped God, claiming their freedom of conscience from Rome and Habsburg. More radical protesters even dared to claim this freedom of conscience for ordinary people, and tried to create heaven on earth (for instance the Anabaptists attempted to establish a New Jerusalem in Münster in 1634). After the emperor realised he could no longer keep the protesting cities and princes within a catholic framework, he acknowledged the latter's religious rights within their jurisdictions. Through the main principle of the Treaty of Augsburg (1555), *cuius regio, eius religio*, Protestant and Catholic members of the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation enshrined this acknowledgement, while refusing it to radicals (*i.e.*,

[101] Spruyt, H. (1994), *The Sovereign State and its Competitors: An Analysis of System Change*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.

Anabaptists and Calvinists). This treaty was however not sufficient to restore order in the Empire and wider Europe. Eventually, the Treaty of Westphalia officially allowed the Calvinist princes and cities into the Empire, and accepted formally Protestant Switzerland and the Dutch Confederation in the European society of Christian nations. It took however until the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s before the Pope officially accepted the Protestant claim for freedom of conscience, although the Vatican already maintained political relations with Protestant nations. At the time of the Treaties of Westphalia, the Vatican fiercely protested being left out of the negotiations, since it was perceived as the one and only divinely ordained final arbitrator in both religious and secular (*in casu* diplomatic) matters.

It is sometimes quipped that Westphalia brought authority down from heaven to earth.[102] Peace became an earthly aim, instead of heavenly duty. That would reflect a shift in the social epistemes of time and space underpinning claims of authority. At least, the territorial stalemate between Catholic and Protestant, imperial and princely forces crushed the previously common rule by pope and emperor of the Christian civilisation. A mutual, political understanding among the royal dynasties and confederations in Europe plus their diplomatic envoys replaced them. Despite the religious wars between Catholics and Protestants, this understanding was still based on a shared Christian belief – referred to as the natural laws God had set for the entire universe. Yet locked into the geographic areas controlled by the dynasties and confederations, politics focused gradually more on the development of these areas. In addition, personal life was less about convincing St. Peter and his Roman church to enter afterlife safely, but living a good life now to earn afterlife individually. To make a long story very short, this heralded the shift towards modernity in which progress in this life became the prominent aim both for the dynasties' territories and individuals. The debate no longer concentrated on the political responsibility over the believers' souls, but on how progress could be achieved for mankind.

[102] Anderson, M. (1996), supra note 45; Wight, M. (1977), *Systems of States*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Pessimism or optimism about human nature influenced the extent in which progress was expected to occur. A connected issue is whether territory is politically instrumental or detrimental to pursuing a good life here on earth. These two issues still divide the theories of International Relations in the universal and optimistic view of Idealism and the territorial and pessimistic view of Realism. Yet, the very question of whether politics based on territory is instrumental for progress, signifies a break with the traditional acceptance of the God-given seasonal cycles. Instead, the instrumental nature of modern politics is about man-made progress in which past underdevelopment is to be eliminated in a future time. The temporal epistemes are no longer about cycles of returning events, but represent unilinear progress of unique events.

The basic unit for measuring this progress in time became the territories of the royal dynasties and confederations in Europe. The renewed attention to the exclusive notion of property rights in Roman law, as well as the single-centeredness in European (artistic) representations supported the focus on central-led, exclusively held territories.[103] The art and science of statistics and geography grew from the desire to measure man-made progress and development within these territories, particularly in France.[104] The focus on Reason, maps and clocks at the time symbolise the shift from passive acceptance of God-given order towards the active disciplining and planning of man and space through clearly delineated fixed geographical areas. This shift in space and time perceptions has been labelled as the shift from mediaeval "organic spatiality" in which people, God and earth are personally connected towards the impersonal, territory-based "engineered spatiality" of modern times.[105] The territorial fixity of the ideal type state not only allowed to map and to plan rationally its development through time, but also to compare it with other territorial states, as if these were its theoretical equals.

---

[103] Spruyt, (1994), supra note 102, p. 104; Strassoldo, R. (1980), 'Centre-Periphery and System-Boundary: Culturological Perspectives', in J. Gottmann (ed.), *Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variations in Politics*. IPSA/ London: Sage. p. 31.

[104] Gottmann, J. (1973), supra note 4; Escolar, M. (2003), supra note 17.

[105] O'Tuathail, G. (1998), 'Postmodern Geopolitics? The Modern Geopolitical Imagination and beyond', in G. O'Tuathail & S. Dalby (1998), *Rethinking Geopolitics*. London: Routledge. pp. 26ff.

Engineered territoriality thus expresses the shifts in authority claims from person-based allegiance to a mythical, traditional, religious or charismatic authority towards a territorial-based authority of rational planning and discipline. The geographical fixity of authority tends to prevent the personal caprices of rulers, the complexities of person-based law and its maintenance, and fragmented distortion of accountability. Instead, impersonal, centrally decided unity of law within an exclusive territorial domain allows for planning and development in the long run. Capitalism and state and nation building could thus be pursued on the basis of long-term, rational planning, the typical feature of Occidental rationality according to Max Weber. In addition, the concentration of political life within a territory directs governing institutions to expand coherently the disciplining of people within the territory-based framework of the state society. In modern times, political territorialisation does not just refer to an increasing use of territory as an instrument for control and the growing primacy of the logic of territoriality in political organisation, but it also refers to an increasing focus on rationality and disciplining. Re-territorialisation subsequently also refers to similar things, but rather at different geographical scales. The discussion is then whether modernisation, progress and development would be pursued better at regional, national, continental or global levels according to a rational calculus.

But what would de-territorialisation mean in this respect? Does present-day modernising progress just refer to the emergence of non-territorial organisations at the expense of territorial organisations, such as the nodal networks of mega-cities? Then, it describes the rise of function-based networks with expert-based authority and cybernetic control of resources and communication, replacing the hierarchical, territorial state as most efficient and rational organisation of modernisation and progress. The difference in time rhythms across the various networks will seriously complicate a coherent co-ordination of political decision-making, as well as the mapping of decision-making by scholars. The speed and spread of present information and communication technology may result in "space-

time compression."[106] Time is no longer contained in the geographical space of states, and simultaneity, instantaneity and immediacy regardless of place will start to characterise conceptions of time and space. The good life will no longer be about there and after (heaven in afterlife in Mediaeval times), here and after (earthly progress of modernity) but here and now (immediate individual satisfaction). De-territorialisation may thus also refer to further developments in the conceptions of time and space, in which rationally planned progress is no longer an aim or possibility. Doubts about progress have emerged because of the experiences of some states, which were rather efficient killing machines, as well as with the great, universal narratives, which have hindered individual freedom of expression. Instead, heterogeneity and maximum individual emancipation has been propagated by so-called postmodernists.

The concept of post-modernity is still lacking a clear-cut definition, let alone a well-founded estimation of its meaning and significance. But the latter may also be the result of a declining will to measure empirically anyway, since collective progress in a territorial framework is no longer perceived the appropriate and desired measuring stick. Moreover, considering the complexities of flexible and fluid networks, one may wonder what units of analysis should be compared to trace patterns of behaviour, a fundamental aim of social sciences. Social sciences are also being fundamentally challenged because the speed of events seriously complicates distinguishing emotional experience, aesthetic evaluation, and value judgment from 'objective' (or at least inter-subjective) description and explanation. State territoriality provides order and oversight to plan the good life and determine scientific analysis. Whereas the issue of modern research was whether researchers could avoid their research being steered by the very territorial analytical instruments he/she used, post-modernity questions altogether whether any objective measurement and analysis is possible at all.

Any satisfactory answer to this fundamental challenge to the temporal-geographical ideas underpinning modern research is not really available, apart from post-modern suggestions of irony, mixing fact and value, and

[106] Harvey, D. (1989), supra note 87.

pragmatism. What has become clear though, tracing changing political territoriality may also indicate fundamental shifts in the social constructs that the social sciences are working in/with. These post-modern reflections on time and space should at least make the researcher more modest when making generalising claims concerning changing political territoriality in the past, the future or in other places, because the analysis of the researcher is informed by present-day constructs of time and space.

2.5 Conclusion

Political territoriality is a geographic strategy for control. The more salient territorial control is, the more geographical fixity, impersonality, exclusivity and centrality leaves its imprint on political relationships. Variation in political territoriality is thus not a question of yes or no. Political territoriality may no longer be the principle upon which a political system is based, yet it may still be used as a strategy of control at a variety of scales, scopes and levels. However, the question remains in what circumstances the logic of political territoriality will fully leave its imprint, also with an eye on the issue of the construction and functioning of the European Union. Chapter 3 shows whether and in what ways the logic of political territoriality impacts on various types of political systems discussed regarding (the future of) the European Union, from states to networks. Chapter 4 develops the theoretical notions to explain the circumstances in which territoriality and its logic can and do define the European Union.